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Abstract 
This study was about the general tenets of positive accounting theory towards accounting practice and disclosure. 
The objective of the study was to examine the relationship between positive accounting theory, accounting practice 
and disclosure in corporate organizations. This study was anchored on the concept of voluntary disclosure and 
stakeholder’s agency theory. It was carried out in Achievers Investment Limited, Ibadan. Primary data is collected 
using purposive sampling technique and the Secondary data was gotten from the company’s audited annual 
financial statements on return on equity for 2012-2015. Multiple linear regression is adopted to analyze the primary 
and secondary data. The study hypothesis was tested at 0.5 per cent level of significance. Findings revealed that 
there is significant relationship between positive accounting theory and financial reporting and disclosure in 
corporate organizations. It is recommended that there is need to explore the principles of positive accounting theory 
in accounting practice and disclosures in corporate organization in Nigeria. 
Keywords: Accounting Practice, Accounting Theory, Corporate Organizations, Disclosures, Financial Reporting, 
Stakeholders, Positive Accounting Theory 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Accounting arisen in the first stages of its historical development, drawing on the customary rules to provide 
financial information to beneficiaries of particular activity (Hassan & Talal, 2015). According to Hendriksen (1982) 
accounting theory may be defined as logical reasoning in the form of a set of broad principles that provide a general 
frame of reference by which accounting practice can be evaluated and guide the development of new practices and 
procedures. The reality is that accounting theories provides a general frame of reference by which accounting 
professionals can be judge and also guide the way to development of new principles and procedure (Adeleke, 
2018). How organization present information in its financial statements is very important because financial 
statements are a central feature of financial reporting, and this is, a principal means of communicating financial 
information to the various stakeholders aside from the investors (Adeleke, 2018). According to Solomon (2007) 
one of the basic principles for the well-functioning of corporate governance system is transparency. The purpose 
of corporate governance is to serve the stakeholders to became better informed, the role of disclosure is important 
no matter of the disclosure form: mandatory or voluntary, financial or non-financial. Corporate governance and 
accountability developments aware companies about the responsibilities they should have towards all their 
stakeholder groups, to the environment and society. In the last decades, the social role of the firm has come under 
increasing scrutiny (Allouche, 2006). The changes in the international business environment have imposed reviews 
in the nature and content of the corporate reporting. The concepts like “sustainable development’’, ‘‘corporate 
sustainability’’, ‘‘corporate social responsibility’’ has revolutionized corporate financial reporting. The later trends 
in business reporting have put in the front line the importance of non-financial disclosure and the growing needs 
of the potential shareholders that expect any company in which they invest to meet certain minimum standards in 
terms of governance and disclosure (Allouche, 2006). 
As the entity’s stakeholders interact with the entity they make decisions which require relevant information 
about the entity’s performance and governance. Investors for example require information about the entity’s 
profitability and risk in order to make investment decisions. Lenders, in making lending decisions, also require 
information about the entity’s ability to repay loans and pay interest thereon. In recent years there have been several 
high profit corporate failures, financial crises and economic scandals which have emphasized the importance of 
transparency and the need for strong corporate governance and disclosures (Linsley &Shrives, 2005; Bendriba, 
2014). Corporate disclosure is regarded as an effective way by which companies communicate their affairs to their 
stakeholders who include investors, lenders, employees, government and the public as well as suppliers and 
customers. Effective corporate disclosure benefits not only the company and its stakeholders but also the economy 
as a whole. However, because corporate disclosure has its costs, there is a tendency among firms not to disclose 
their affairs fully but only to disclose after considering the costs and benefits involved (Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux & 
Magnan, 2009). This tendency has made corporate disclosure a recurrent theme amongst regulators, the academia 
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as well as politicians (Davey, 2008) 
Adeleke (2018) observed that over the years, accounting theories have helped to strengthen various 
assumptions and principles in the financial reporting policies of most organizations. However, despite this 
advantage, some researchers and globally recognized standard setting bodies, still see some of these accounting 
theories as contradictory. According to IASB (2008) the presence of so many alternatives in theories, has resulted 
in several criticisms, and this has made it difficult to compare various organizations financial report. Also 
according to European Commission (2011) most of the preparers of these financial reports do not give adequate 
consideration to the different peculiarities in some organizations operations before publishing most of these 
accounting theories, and this has made it difficult for these organizations to adopt these theories. The problem of 
this study is to examine if some specific theories (e.g. normative and positive theory) also have controversial 
meaning to organization. Cormier et al (2009) remarked that the basic principles Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) 
is perhaps aptly suited making disclosures in corporate organizations. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine the role of the general tenets of positive accounting theory 
towards accounting practice and disclosure among corporate organizations in Nigeria. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
2.1.1 The Concept of Voluntary Disclosure 
According to Ahmed (1994), the primary objective of traditional financial reporting is the disclosure of financial 
data within the framework of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). Nevertheless, despite their global 
importance, both sets of accounting standards have major deficiencies from a capital market perspective. For 
instance, conventional standards provide a huge scope for managerial profit manipulation. In addition, the 
retrospective nature of the financial reporting process means that the reported data is not always a reliable basis 
for forecasting future performance, which can result in a loss in credibility from a stakeholder perspective. 
Furthermore, contemporary accounting reports focus almost exclusively on quantitative data and typically, reveal 
little about issues such as investment risks and the long-term effects of capital investments (Edogiawerie & David, 
2016). In addition, key drivers of corporate value in critical areas of the business are not reported to investors 
under the traditional accounting model, for instance, human capital, customer relations, innovation, research and 
development, and corporate reputation. In recent years, however, both theorists and practitioners have begun to 
recognize the inherent shortcomings of traditional reporting and have developed models for additional voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., the value reporting framework developed by Price water house Coopers) (Amernic & Maiocco 
1981; Edogiawerie & David, 2016). These business reporting frameworks provide information supplementary to 
the traditional financial report and may help investors to better identify value-driving activities. Although the 
developments in the field are emerging on a rather piecemeal basis, voluntary reporting is now, nonetheless, 
gradually being accepted as part of the company’s official external reporting (Bradbury, 1992: Edogiawerie & 
David, 2016).  
Reporting and disclosure are the most important tools that companies use to communicate with their 
stakeholders. Disclosure is a crucial element in ensuring the effective allocation of resources in society and 
diminishing the information asymmetry between company and its stakeholders. Companies have at their disposal 
two kinds of publishing variants through which they can diminish the informational asymmetry towards their 
stakeholders: compulsory and voluntary disclosure. The most important publishing variant is represented by the 
compulsory disclosure. The mandatory character of reporting is ruled at national or even regional level through 
professional organizations or government authorities, being practiced in most of the countries by all the firms 
regardless of their size, their judicial, fiscal or national accounting system, the favorite finance sources and other 
factors with impact on disclosure policy (Edogiawerie & David, 2016). The second, voluntary disclosure comes 
to complement the mandatory reporting process that often seems to be inadequate for satisfying user’s needs. 
Traditional financial reporting mostly provides historical information, moreover, in certain industries, 
conventional accounting and reporting strategies may not be sufficient to accurately represent the complexity of a 
firm’s operations. Mandatory disclosure refers to those aspects and information which must he published as a 
consequence of’ the existence of some legal or statutory stipulations, capital markets, stock exchanges 
commissions or accounting authorities’ regulations. The aim of mandatory disclosure is to satisfy the user’s 
informational needs, ensuring the production quality control through the laws and standards observance (Ahmed, 
1994; Edogiawerie &David, 2016). 
The voluntary disclosure has its sources in the past of the business development, when, as a result of the fact 
that owners have delegated to the managers the leading function of the enterprises, the need for voluntary 
disclosure appears as a consequence of the information asymmetry between the two parties: managers are better 
informed about the business than its owners. The development the capital market has led to a more and more 
emphasized manifestation of’ the voluntary disclosure. The voluntary disclosure regards information made public 
through the firm’s free choice. It is influence by culture, social economic and behavioral factors that are specific 
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to each firm (Ahmed, 1994; Edogiawerie and David, 2016). There is no generally accepted definition or theoretical 
background for voluntary disclosure. Thus, voluntary disclosure can he explained as being an additional offer of 
information in relation to different national regulations or international referential of business reporting, that is, 
something that is not compulsory by the law, but becomes voluntary through the behavior regarding publication. 
In other words, the voluntary offer of information represents the excess of information, dependent both on the free 
choice of the enterprise leadership and on the regulations in force, the outside pressures of the capital markets, 
financial analysts, consulting firms and the cultural factors (Ahmed, 1994; Edogiawerie and David, 2016). 
Although the voluntary disclosure represents the reporting outside the financial statements, which is not explicitly 
ruled through norms or laws, it is admitted that many of these voluntary disclosures” are made in order to be in 
agreement with the requests of the stock-exchange commission regarding: the companies presentation, analysis 
and management presentations regarding risk, opportunities and the results obtained or provisioned., therefore, in 
order to obtain capital and moreover to attract investors, companies often voluntarily disclose corporate 
information seen in the absence of regulation (Edogiawerie & David, 2016).  
2.1.2 Concept of Financial Reporting 
Financial reporting involves recording financial information according to relevant accounting standards. 
According to (Vargiya, 2015) financial reporting includes the exposure of related financial information to the 
different Stakeholders about an organization over a predefined timeframe. These Stakeholders include – investors, 
lenders, suppliers, and government organizations. Financial Reporting is considered as the final result of 
Accounting. It comprises of various important statement which include financial related explanations from 
Statement of financial position, Statement of comprehensive income, Statement of cash flow, Statement of changes 
in equity, notes to financial related explanations, quarterly and Annual reports (if there should be an occurrence of 
quoted organizations), Prospectus (if there should be an occurrence of organizations going for Initial Public Offers) 
and Management Discussion and Analysis (if there should be an occurrence of open organizations) (Vargiya, 2015; 
Saliu, 2015). 
2.1.3 Concept of Reliability of Financial Reporting 
The expression ‘‘reliable quality’’ in connection to financial communication is a vital subjective property of 
accounting information.  This term is imperative and may impact whether the information is helpful to the 
individuals who read financial related explanation or something else. The reliable quality of inspected corporate 
yearly financial report is thought to be vital and a fundamental element influencing the convenience of information 
made accessible to different users. The accounting researches have perceived that the dependability of reports is a 
critical normal for financial accounting information and for administrative and expert offices. Reliable quality idea 
is a nature of information that guarantees the management that the information contained in the financial related 
records catches the genuine conditions and occasions of the communication substance. The International 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was the main standard setter to characterize the term dependability. As far 
as the FASB Concepts Statement No. 2 (FASB, 1980) the dependability of a measure lays on the loyalty with 
which it speaks to what it implies to present (portrayal dedication), combined with an affirmation for the client, 
which comes through confirmation, that it has that representational quality (undeniable nature). In Contrast, the 
IASB Framework expresses that information has the nature of dependability when it is free from material blunder 
and inclination and can be relied on by customers to speak to reliably which it either indicates to speak to or could 
sensibly be required to speak to. In the IASB Framework five qualities are included under the idea of dependability: 
loyal portrayal, substance over form, nonpartisanship (Vargiya, 2015; Saliu, 2015).  
The attributes of reliable quality are: 
I) True and reasonable 
Reliable information implies that the financial proclamations are an impression of the organization's financial 
reality. At the end of the day, are there a genuine and reasonable introduction of the organization’s working 
outcomes and its financial condition? However, what is ‘‘genuine and reasonable’’? In an International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) setting, ‘‘genuine’’ implies that the information is objective and spoke to in an 
unprejudiced way and ‘‘reasonable’’ implies that sound judgment wins in light of the fact that IFRS supports 
utilizing financial saving advantage parameters to adjust the premiums of the peruses with the cost of planning 
IFRS financial exposures. 
II) Free of Material Blunder 
All together for information to be solid, it must be free of material mistakes. Material things are those that can 
possibly change the feeling of the users of the financial proclamations. Material information must not be withheld 
from loan specialists and lenders. On the off chance that there is any uncertainty about whether a thing is material 
or not, the information ought to be given to the users of the financial explanations. Full exposure is dependably 
the shrewd decision. 
III) Neutral 
Reliable information should likewise be impartial. It must be free from inclination. In spite of the fact that it is 
unimaginable in view of human instinct to totally wipe out every single inclination, bookkeeper should consistently 
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attempt to be autonomous. The notes to the financial articulations ought to be painstakingly composed in a way 
that passes on the actualities without communicating any individual perspectives. 
IV) Completeness 
Reliable information should likewise be finished. One of the objectives of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) is to rouse certainty that all correlated information is included. 
V) Substance 
Decisions about whether information about individual transactions ought to be accounted for must be founded on 
the expectation of displaying a genuine and reasonable photo of the organization’s outcomes and financial 
condition. IFRS is evident that mirroring the organization’s financial reality in its financial related articulations 
involves substance over shape. 
VI) Prudence 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) requires that bookkeepers who plan financial related 
articulations must exercise judgment in managing the inescapable instabilities of valuation and materiality. They 
are relied upon to utilize a level of alert in making these judgments. Accounting experts must be judicious in their 
approach by considering every one of the realities and information, both target and subjective, to deliver financial 
articulations that meet the reliable quality prerequisite of IFRS. 
2.1.4 Tenets of Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) and Accounting Practice 
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) is concerned with predicting actions such as the choices of accounting policies 
by firm managers and how managers will respond to proposed new accounting standards. The term ‘‘positive’’ 
refers to a theory that attempts to make good predictions of real world events (Scott, 2003). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) develop a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. They 
investigate the factors influencing management’s attitude (lobbying behavior) on accounting standards including 
regulation, political costs, management compensation plans, taxes and information production (e.g. book keeping). 
They argued that individuals act to maximize their own utility and management lobbies on accounting standards 
based on their own self-interests, for example managers have incentives to choose accounting standards which 
report lower earnings due to tax, and political and regulatory systems. The findings showed that firm size is the 
most important factor, explaining managerial behavior towards financial accounting standards. This is explained 
in the sense that the larger firms are more likely to be subjected to governmental interference costs (political costs) 
than smaller firms. 
According to Basu (2009) positive accounting is very much different from conservative accounting approach 
because it assumes that conservative accounting yields sub-optimal results. Conservative accounting requires 
lower magnitude of verifiability to recognize losses whereas it requires very high degree of verifiability to 
recognize gains. The contractual view of positive accounting puts it in tension with value relevance studies in 
accounting. Positive accounting considers that accounting’s primary role is to value the firm which indicates that 
positive accounting favors efficiency perspective which emphasizes how various managers choose accounting 
methods that show a true representation of the firm’s performance (Basu, 2009; Shubhankar, 2015) (see fig 1).  
This efficiency perspective of positive accounting can be explained alternatively through the opportunistic 
perspective which hold the view that managers, who are agents to the owners (shareholders, represented by the 
board of directors), act to their self-interests. They only adopt accounting policies that allow them to benefit and 
they think what is good for them is also good for the firms. In this regard, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) highlight 
three main hypotheses for PAT such as political cost, bonus plan, and debt hypothesis that reveal the motives of 
the managers in choosing one accounting method over another.  
Shubhankar (2015) succinctly espoused these tenets of PAT in the light of the choice of accounting practices 
in corporate organizations as follows: 
a) Bonus Scheme or Compensation Hypothesis 
The management compensation hypothesis affirms that managers who have accounting incentives or their 
remuneration that is attached with the firm’s accounting performance will tend to maneuver accounting method in 
a way which will reflect better accounting figures that they would be; in this regard, methods of depreciation, 
uncollectible allowance and research and development costs would be treated in a way which will incentivize the 
managers. 
b) Debt-Equity Hypothesis 
The debt-equity hypothesis states that managers will tend to cook the financial statements which show better profits 
as similar to the bonus plan with the anticipation of having a better performance and liquidity position which will 
exhibit better condition to pay the interest and principal of the debt owners. 
c) Political Cost Hypothesis 
The political cost hypothesis presumes that firms will tend to decorate their financial statements in a way which 
does not attract the attention of the politicians, policy makers so that no adverse or extra regulations in respect of 
tax or compliances are imposed. What are the other factors that motivate companies to change accounting methods? 
First and foremost, generalized answer to this question is managers have self-interest in how the financial 
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statements make the company look. They naturally wish to show their financial performance in the best light. A 
favorable profit picture can influence investors, and a strong liquidity position can influence creditors. Too 
favorable a profit picture, however, can provide union negotiators and government regulators with ammunition 
during bargaining talks. Hence, managers might have varying motives for reporting income numbers (Shubhankar, 
2015). 
Shubhankar (2015) affirmed that in addition to these fundamental tenets of PAT, studies have provided 
additional insights into why companies may prefer certain accounting methods over others and the reasons behind 
them are as follows: 
1) Political Costs 
As companies become larger and more politically visible, politicians and regulators devote more attention to them. 
The larger the firm, the more likely it is to become subject to regulation such as antitrust, and the more likely it is 
to be required to pay higher taxes. Therefore, companies that are politically visible may seek to report low income 
numbers, to avoid the scrutiny of regulators. In addition, other constituents, such as labor unions, may be less 
willing to ask for wage increases if reported income is low. Researchers have found that the larger the company, 
the more likely it is to adopt income-decreasing approaches in selecting accounting methods. 
2). Capital Structure 
A number of studies have indicated that the capital structure of the company can affect the selection of accounting 
methods. For example, a company with high debt to equity ratio is more likely to be constrained by debt covenants. 
The debt covenant may indicate that the company cannot pay dividends if retained earnings fall below a certain 
level. As a result, such a company is more likely to select accounting methods that will increase net income. 
3). Bonus Payments 
Studies  have  found  that  if  compensation  plans  tie  managers’  bonus  payments  to  income, management will 
select accounting methods that maximize their bonus payments. 
4). Manage or Smooth Earnings 
Substantial earnings increase attracts the attention of politicians, regulators and competitors. In addition, a large 
increase in income is difficult to achieve in following years. Further, executive compensation plans would use 
these higher numbers as a baseline and make it difficult for managers to earn bonuses in subsequent years. 
Conversely, investors and competitors might view large decreases in earnings as a signal that the company is in 
financial trouble. Also, substantial decreases in income raise concerns on the part of stockholders, lenders, and 
other interested parties about the competency of management. For all these reasons, companies have an incentive 
to “manage” or “smooth” earnings. In general, management tends to believe that a steady (say 10% for an example) 
growth per year is much better than a 30% growth one year and a 10% decline next year (Shubhankar, 2015). 
Scott (2003) argued that firms accounting policies will be chosen as part of the broader problem of attaining 
efficient corporate governance which requires trading of cost of capital (debt and equity) and contracting costs 
(contracts with managers, suppliers, capital providers which results in costs such as negotiation, monitoring, 
bankruptcy). PAT, does not suggest that firms or standard setters should completely specify the accounting policies 
they use because this would be otherwise too costly. Hassan (2008) argued that profit after tax (PAT) helps to 
explain how a conflict of interest between managers, shareholders and debt holders influences the corporation’s 
accounting practices. 
Many disclosure studies examined disclosure practice in the light of PAT. Among PAT hypotheses, the 
political-cost hypothesis is the most widely used in disclosure literature. Political- costs theory is linked to 
disclosure practice in the sense that certain companies (e.g. large firms) attract the attention of the media, public 
and politicians. These firms have incentives to disclose more information voluntarily in order to manipulate their 
image and deflect unwanted attention (Linsley & Shrives, 2000; Abdulla, 2011). 
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2.1.5. Conceptual Framework of General Tenets of Positive Accounting Theories, Accounting Practice and 
Disclosure in Corporate Organizations in Nigeria 
 
Fig 1.  Authors’ Conceptual Framework of General Tenets of Positive Accounting Theories, Accounting Practice 
and Disclosure in Corporate Organizations in Nigeria Model 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 Stakeholder’s Theory 
According to Fredman (1994), stakeholder theory emphasizes that some individual or group are very important 
for the survival of the organization. This explanation is seen as organization oriented explanation, but in an earlier 
research freeman reported that stakeholder theory refers to any group or individual who can affect or who is likely 
to be affected by the achievement of the organization  objective. The stakeholder in most organizations usually 
includes shareholders, employees, customers, lenders, suppliers, local charities, various interest group and 
government. Clarke (2004) reported that stakeholder’s theory emphasizes that all stakeholders have right to be 
provided with relevant information about how the organization and this information could involve information 
about influence of pollution from the organization to the environment, information about community sponsorship, 
information on provision of employment, information on safety initiative provided by the organization etc. He also 
emphasized that this information should be provided to the stakeholders even though they do not affect the survival 
of the organization (Clarke, 2004). 
2.2.2 Agency Theory 
According to this theory when one party (the principal) delegates decision making powers to another party (the 
agent) under a contract, a principal – agent relationship arises (Jensen et.al 1976; Clarke, 2004). Jensen et.al (1979) 
defined the principal-agent relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (principals) engages another 
person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf, which involves giving some decision making authority 
to the agent. While the intention of both parties in the agency relationship is to work towards the interest of the 
principal, information asymmetry and greed lure management into pursuing personal objectives instead of those 
of the principal. This conflict of interest or lack of goal congruence between management and the shareholders is 
described as the agency problem (Clarke, 2004). 
A typical example of the principal–agent relationship is that between management and shareholders. The 
relationship arises when shareholders delegate the administration of an entity to management, thus making 
management the agent of the shareholders. In this kind of relationship, the expectation is that the agent 
(management) will pursue the shareholders’ wealth maximization objective (Clarke, 2004). In the shareholder – 
management relationship the agency problem may take different forms, for example, management may pay 
themselves hefty remuneration packages, undertake risky investment projects or because of information 
asymmetry and greed, management may pursue personal objectives instead of those of the principal, or they may 
operate less profitably (Gitman, 2009). 
Another example of the principal – agent relationship is that between shareholders (through management) 
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and lenders. Lenders entrust their money to shareholders, with the expectation that shareholders will honor the 
loan covenants agreed between the two parties. However, what may happen is that the shareholders, through 
management, may pay themselves excessive dividends or take on more loans contrary to the existing covenants 
with the lenders (Gitman, 2009). 
The agency theory’s concern to solving the agency problem has led to two somehow different but 
complementary versions of the theory; the positivist version and the principal – agent version. According to the 
positivist version of the agency theory, the agency problem can be solved by prescribing the appropriate 
governance mechanisms to limit the agent’s opportunistic behavior. document that the proponents of the Positivist 
Theory are more concerned with describing the mechanisms  that  solve  the  agency  problem  than  with  the  
various  forms  that  the  agency relationship may take or the optimal governance mechanism to apply (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Clarke, 2004). 
Positivists propose two alternative approaches in solving the agency problem depending on the extent to 
which the principal is able to observe the behavior of the agent. When the behavior of the agent is not observable 
this version of the Agency Theory recommends an outcome type of contract. This is a contract in which the 
principal remunerates the agent on the basis of outcome Eisenhardt (1989) argued that such a contract will 
automatically realign the agent’s goals to those of the principal. Remuneration in the form of share options is an 
example of this type of outcome- based contract. He remarked that alternatively, the principal can invest in 
information systems such as budgeting, and corporate disclosure that motivate the agent to align his goals with 
those of the principal. 
The principal – agent version of the agency theory, on the other hand, is concerned with the general theory 
of agent-principal relationships as well as with the best approach to solving the agency problem. It is general in 
that it can be applied in different forms of the principal – agent relationships including the customer – supplier, 
bank – customer and employee – employer relationships, and not just with the owner – management relationship 
as with the Positivist version. Its approach to the agency problem involves determining the optimal contract 
between the principal and the agent depending on the extent to which the behavior of the agent is observable 
(Clarke, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, when the behavior of the agent is unobservable the principal – agent 
version of the agency theory proposes that the principal should either use an outcome based contract or invest in 
information systems such as budgeting and disclosure that assist the principal in knowing what the agent is doing. 
On the other hand, where the principal does know what the agent is doing, the principal should use a behavior-
based contract to mitigate the agency problem (Clarke, 2004). 
The two versions of the agency theory are complimentary in that they both prescribe investment in 
information systems as one of the solutions to the agency problem. From a financial reporting and accounting 
perspective, the agency theory explains and predicts accounting practice by citing the use of accounting practices 
to reduce information asymmetry, promote transparency and fight agency problems. Typical accounting rules and 
regulations that explain how the Agency Theory influences mandatory corporate disclosure include the disclosure 
of related party transactions, directors remuneration and auditor’s remuneration (Clarke, 2004). 
 
3.0 Methodology 
This study adopted a survey research method, which is based on the distribution of questionnaire. A purposive 
technique was adopted to approach to achiever’s investment limited, Ibadan where the study was conducted. A 
total of 16 questionnaires were distributed among accounts and financial analyst/experts in the company order to 
elicit data on the use of positive accounting theories in corporate accounting practice, financial reporting and 
disclosure. The study adopted a multiple linear regression to test the hypothesis of the study. 
 
3.1 Model Specification 
This model is based on the description of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables of this 
research work. 
Y = f (X) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(i) 
Where Y = dependent Variable – Accounting practice represented by information on the financial statement and 
disclosure. 
X = Independent Variable is positive accounting theories represented 
The multiple linear regression model for this study is defined as: 
Y= β1 + β1X1 + β2X2 + e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (ii)  
Regression line equation: Info = β0 + β2 PstAhry + e 
Where: β0 = Constant 
InfonAp = Information on the financial statement and disclosure 
PstAhry = Positive accounting theory 
β1 and β2: Regression parameters. e = error term 
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4.1 Test of Hypotheses 
There is no significant relationship between positive accounting theory and accounting practice and disclosure in 
corporate organizations in Nigeria. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Model variables 
Descriptive Statistics 







Positive accounting theory 
 
Use principles of positive accounting theory in accounting 
practices 
 
Use principles of positive accounting theory in disclosure 
 
Benefits of disclosure to overall organizational performance 
 
Recommendation for post qualification and registration 





































Source: Authors’ Computation from SPSS output 
Table 4.2: Model Summary 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .846a .816 .612 .63818 
Source: Authors’ Computation from SPSS output  
a. Predictors: (Constant):  Use principles of positive accounting theory in accounting practices, use principles of 
positive accounting theory in disclosure,  benefits of disclosure to overall organizational performance, 
recommendation for post qualification and registration 
Table 4.3:Anova Model 
Anova Model 
Model Sum of quares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1        Regression 
Residual 
Total 
11.270 4 2.818 6.918 .005b 
4.480 11 .407   
15.750 15    
Source: Authors’ Computation from SPSS output 
a.  Dependent Variable: Positive accounting theory 
b.  Predictors:  (Constant): use  principles  of  positive  accounting  theory  in  accounting practices, use principles 
of positive accounting theory in disclosure, benefits of disclosure to overall organizational performance, 
recommendation for post qualification and registration trainings in emerging accounting theories and trends. 
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Table 4.4: Coefficient of the Model Dependent Variables 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation from SPSS output  
a.   Dependent Variable: Principles of positive accounting theory. 
 
4.2 Discussion of Findings 
Table 4.1 (descriptive statistics) showed the mean and the standard deviation of the dependent and independent 
variables.   The model summary, the R- squared (0.816) which is a coefficient of determination gives the proportion 
or percentage of the total variation in the dependent variable explained by the explanatory variables. This indicates 
that there is 81.6 per cent relationship between the predictors (independent variables) and predicted (dependent 
variable) i.e. 81.6 per cent of the variation has been accounted for and 18.6 per cent of the variation may be due to 
error or other variables which the model could account for. 
From the table 4.4, the coefficient of the independent variable in the model are all significant which implies 
that there is a relationship between general tenets of positive accounting theory and accounting practice and 
financial disclosure in corporate organization. Moreover, the results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) points 
to the fact that the more general tenets of positive accounting are enforced and applied in accounting practice, the 
more equip are corporate organization capability to make financial disclosure. If calculated F value in a test is 
larger than your F statistics, you can reject the null hypothesis. From the ANOVA table, the F value is (6.918) is 
larger than the F statistics (3.36) from the F table of the statistical table. From this, we reject the null hypothesis. 
All the independent variables are all significant i.e. significance level < 0.05. Conclusively we reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that there is significant relationship between positive accounting 
theory and financial reporting and disclosure in corporate organizations. 
The findings of this study are similar to the interpretation given by previous researchers who emphasized that 
both normative and positive theories have significant impact on accounting records of organization (Watts & 
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Zimmerman, 1978; Adeleke & Olukayode, 2018). 
 
5.0 Summary and Conclusion 
This study conclude that positive accounting theory has a positive significant relationship with accounting practice 
and disclosure of financial information in corporate organization, and this was confirmed by the F-value obtained 
from the analysis of variance table (ANOVA) is higher than the F statistics and all significant levels are lowered 
than the (0.05) level of significant stated for the study. 
Based on the above, the following recommendations are suggested: 
1).       Quoted corporate organization should be consistent in the application of the tenets of positive accounting 
theory in general accounting practice (preparation of their records, since this study has established statistically that 
accounting theory has significant relationship with practice). 
3).      There is need to explore the principles of positive accounting theory in corporate organizations financial 
disclosure process as disclosure would position the organization for healthy and sustainable growth. 
2.)       Since theories drivers practice in every profession, corporate organization should as matter of priority 
encourage period trainings in emerging theories of accounting and trends, in order to be abreast with best practice 
in the profession. 
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